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The role of computer simulation for theory construction in social psychology 
needs to be better understood. It should be viewed as a medium through which 
theoretical propositions can be articulated and predictions can be generated. It 
is one of several symbol systems available to theorists for expressing theoretical 
ideas. The first symbol system acquired by students in social psychology is natural 
language and the second is mathematics. Computer simulation offers a third 
symbol system. Theorists express their ideas in a program, and a computer is 
used to facilitate the generation of predictions from the theory-as-program. Five 
complexities inherent in social behavior have resisted theoretical understanding 
using the first two symbol systems. They are multiple manifestations of a single 
latent variable, qualitative cognitive and social structures, models of the linkage 
between latent variables and their overt expression, the interface between multiple 
latent variables, and time. The third symbol system, computer simulation, offers 
a substantial advantage to social psychologists attempting to develop formal 
theories of complex and interdependent social phenomena. Q 1988 Academic press. 
Inc. 
Computer simulation is finally coming of age in social psychology. The 
other papers in this issue of the Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 
illustrate the breadth of phenomena for which simulations have been 
developed. The papers use simulations to theoretically probe social mem- 
ory, impression judgments, and group discussion and decision making. 
Simulation approaches have been advocated by social psychologists 
for more than 25 years. In 1960, Carl Hovland strongly encouraged their 
use in theorizing about complex human processes. His paper nicely 
summarized the value of simulations for theory development, and went 
on to discuss the empirical obligations of researchers who use simulations. 
Portions of this paper were presented at a symposium on “Computer simulations of 
social behavior” given at the Society of Experimental Social Psychology annual meeting, 
Charlottesville, VA, October, 1987. I thank Li Fan, Pam Hall, Tandy Herren, Rich Petty, 
Constantine Sedikides, and Alan Strathman for their helpful comments on an earlier draft 
of this paper. Reprints can be obtained from Thomas M. Ostrom, Department of Psychology, 
Ohio State University, Columbus, OH 43210. 
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Unfortunately, the illustrations offered by Hovland only pertained to 
subjects like problem solving, learning, concept formation, and neural 
networks, and not to topic areas of more direct interest to social 
psychologists. 
Eight years later, Robert Abelson (1968) published a chapter in the 
Handbook ofSocial Psychology on the “Simulation of Social Behavior.” 
It presented a thorough analysis of the virtues of simulations, and even 
today provides the best starting point for social psychologists interested 
in learning about simulation approaches. 
Abelson reviewed some of the same simulations of cognitive processes 
that Hovland had covered. But more usefully, he also provided a review 
of complete simulations that dealt with fundamental social processes. 
These models pertained to issues at the heart of social psychology, 
including social exchange, coalition formation, emotional responses to 
other people, attitude change, and social influence. 
Despite the clear relevance of these models to social psychology, the 
simulation approach had not caught the imagination of main stream social 
psychologists. Very few simulations had appeared in the core journals 
of the field prior to the publication of Abelson’s chapter. In fact, only 
5 of the 206 references in his chapter were to papers in the Journal of 
Abnormal and Social Psychology, Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, and Journal of Experimental Social Psychology. At the time 
of Abelson’s writing, simulation models had not made much contact with 
the dominant empirical pursuits of the field. 
The present issue of this journal demonstrates that computer simulations 
can play an integral role in advancing understanding of important social 
psychological phenomena. The papers share a similar structure. They 
all begin with a well-established empirical phenomenon that had been 
the target of inquiry in main stream journals. The papers offer fairly 
intricate models, verbally conveyed to the reader, that provide a possible 
account for the empirical findings. In each case, the complexity of the 
model is so great that it is impossible to tell from the verbal presentation 
whether the model does, indeed, account for the data. Therefore the 
authors chose to represent the model as a computer program and run it 
on a computer to generate the models’ predictions. Predictions are then 
presented and comparisons with the data are made. Finally, the model’s 
viability is assessed. 
COMPUTER SIMULATIONS AS THEORY 
This paper offers a view of simulations that may be at odds with the 
views held by some readers, especially those whose primary acquaintance 
with simulations is from Abelson’s (1968) chapter in the Handbook. Many 
in the field appear to regard computer simulation as merely a method. 
This erroneous view of simulations was encouraged in part by the placement 
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of Abelson’s chapter into Volume 2 of the Handbook. This volume was 
devoted exclusively to research methods in social psychology. Other 
chapters in that volume covered topics like data analysis, attitude mea- 
surement, observational methods, and interviewing techniques. 
A second reason workers may regard simulations as a method is that 
the longest section in Abelson’s chapter is titled “The methodology of 
computer simulation.” It covers issues like problem selection, preparation 
of flow charts, computer capacity, selection of programing languages, 
and debugging of programs. All of this could lead the casual reader to 
assume that computer simulation is merely a technology, like content 
analysis and attitude measurement, that is only used for special purposes. 
The view offered in this paper is that computer simulation is a symbol 
system; it is a medium through which theoretical concepts can be rep- 
resented and communicated. Rather than being a special-purpose tech- 
nology, it is regarded as offering theorists in all areas of social psychology 
an alternative way of expressing their ideas. 
I refer to computer simulation in this paper as the third symbol system. 
By symbol system, I refer to the symbols through which we express our 
theoretical (as well as all other) ideas and communicate them to others 
in the field. We use a symbol system to represent concepts and to express 
propositions that causally relate concepts to one another. Symbol systems 
have an associated syntax that provide rules for manipulating the symbols, 
and so allow predictions to be generated from primitives and propositions. 
The first symbol system that is universally used by social psychologists 
is natural language, such as English in the case of this paper. Natural 
language is rich in concepts and provides an enormous flexibility to the 
theorist in representing conceptual nuances. It has the additional advantage 
that social psychologists (like all other scientists) are fluent in this symbol 
system prior to receiving their formal training in the field. For most of 
the problems addressed by theorists in social psychology, the natural 
language symbol system has been adequate to yield substantial advances 
in understanding. 
Social psychology has also recognized the theoretical utility of a second 
symbol system, mathematics. This symbol system offers quantitative 
precision and unequivocal specificity in articulating variables and rela- 
tionships. The field’s acceptance of mathematics as a symbol system can 
be seen in Volume 1 of the 1968 Handbook ofSocial Psychology (Lindzey 
& Aronson, 1968). This volume was devoted to systematic positions 
(i.e., theories) in social psychology. It contained chapters covering stimulus- 
response, psychodynamic, cognitive, and role theories. It also contained 
a chapter titled “Mathematical models of social behavior.” The editors 
recognized that mathematics, as a symbol system, provided unique assets 
to the theorist and accorded it the stature of inclusion in the theories 
volume. The same recognition was not extended to computer simulations. 
Any theory that can be expressed in either of the first two symbol 
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systems can also be expressed in the third symbol system. Computer 
simulations can be used for representing both qualitative, natural language 
constructs and quantitative, mathematical constructs. The basic idea is 
simple. The theoretical constructs are expressed through a higher level 
language like BASIC, FORTRAN, or LISP in the form of a detailed 
computer program. The symbol system is defined in terms of the properties 
of that programing language. 
The program becomes the theory. Programs also contain some book- 
keeping information that is irrelevent to the processes being modeled, 
but these can easily be separated from the key theoretical propositions. 
The predictions of the theory can efficiently be obtained by running 
the program on a computer. The computer itself, then, plays no role 
other than providing a speedy way of discovering the implications of 
one’s theoretical ideas. It is like using a pocket calculator for obtaining 
the product of two five-digit numbers rather than doing it with paper 
and pencil. 
VERBAL THEORIES AS COMPUTER SIMULATIONS 
Social psychology is replete with verbal theories. Sometimes people 
have contrasted verbal theories against computer simulations, implying 
that a theory can be one or the other, but not both. This is a misconception. 
In fact, any verbal theory can be expressed in the form of a computer 
simulation. All existing theories of attraction, competition, aggression, 
attitudes, attribution, and leadership, along with theories regarding every 
other facet of social psychology, can be stated as a simulation. 
For most theories in social psychology, there is not a great deal to be 
gained from translating it into a simulation. The major benefit would be 
an increase in the precision of the formulation. The theorist would be 
made more aware of unstated assumptions and of the need to unambig- 
uously delineate all relevent contingencies and ramifications. But for 
most verbal theories in social psychology, the theorist provides sufficient 
specificity to allow empirical evaluation of the model’s basic tenets. Also, 
the theorist is as able to generate predictions from the theory in its verbal 
form as would be the case if a simulation had been prepared. 
Over the last 40 years or more (since the work on “grand theories” 
such as Lewin’s field theory), social psychology had become preoccupied 
with the development of mini theories. Typically, these are theories that 
focus on a single latent variable such as attitude, leadership, or judgment. 
Verbal theories have been productive in uncovering the processes operative 
within such focused, yet limited, modules of understanding. But the field 
is now ready to move beyond these mini theories and to theoretically 
address more complex social behavior. 
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FIVE UNSOLVED COMPLEXITIES OF SOCIAL BEHAVIOR 
Verbal theories in the field have not come to grips with many of the 
fundamental complexities of social behavior. In this section I outline five 
complexities that have proven elusive to social psychological theorists. 
The first symbol system allows us to acknowledge and discuss these 
complexities, but it has not led to any substantial advancement in our 
conceptual understanding of them. On the other hand, the third symbol 
system, computer simulation, holds great promise in illuminating the 
dynamics underlying these complexities. Herein lies the enormous potential 
of computer simulation for social psychology. 
The First Complexity: Multiple Manifestations 
Almost all of our theories are univariate in nature. In reading through 
introductory textbooks, we see a portrait of the field as dependent variable 
oriented. Theories of attitude, aggression, attraction, and attribution are 
all theories that aim to explain the determinants of single dependent 
variables. 
Every construct (or latent variable) in social psychology has multiple 
manifestations. Attitudes, as one example, is most often measured on a 
self-rating scale. The field has recognized for a long time that there is 
more to attitudes than a simple self rating (e.g., Breckler, 1984; Ostrom, 
1969). People engage in a variety of approach or avoidance behaviors, 
they carry a variety of beliefs about the attitude object, and they experience 
a variety of emotional responses when encountering or thinking about 
the object. These implicit responses may or may not be communicated 
to others verbally and nonverbally. They may be brief or extended in 
time. 
Verbal theories of attitude view these multiple manifestations as out- 
croppings or multiple indicators of the construct (Webb, Campbell, 
Schwartz, Secrest, & Grove, 1981). By doing so, theorists implicitly 
dismiss the importance of understanding the underlying dynamics of these 
multifaceted phenomena. Researchers make no attempt to provide a 
theory of when one vs another manifestation will emerge. The third 
symbol system holds out hope for providing systematic theory that ad- 
dresses this complexity. The paper by Stasser in this issue provides one 
illustration of how this can be accomplished in the area of group decision 
making. 
The Second Complexity: Qualitative Structures 
Not only have theories in social psychology been dependent variable 
oriented, but they have further restricted the constructs by representing 
the latent variable as a continuum. Attitudes fall on a pro-to-con continuum, 
aggression varies from low to high, and attributions go from situational 
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to dispositional. The objective of these theories is to discover the forces 
that move a person from one point to another on the dimension. 
There is more to social behavior than just locating it as a point on a 
continuum. As I have argued elsewhere (Devine & Ostrom, in press; 
Ostrom, 1981a; 1981b; 1987; in press), the dimensional approach overlooks 
many important qualitative phenomena. Only recently have qualitative 
cognitive structures become a focus of research in social psychology. 
Researchers in the area of person perception are moving away from their 
previous preoccupation with impression ratings (on a scale of favorable 
to unfavorable) and trait ratings. They have now begun to look at the 
determinants and consequences of such qualitative structures as scripts, 
linear orders, hierarchies, images, and story representations. Smith’s 
paper in this issue of the journal illustrates how simulations can provide 
a powerful symbol system for representing the processes of information 
storage and access in terms of qualitative feature arrays. 
Qualitative structures are also important in the study of group processes. 
The emergence of roles and dominance structures, the patterning of 
formal and informal communication actions and the sequencing of com- 
munication content (as with the Bales categories) are all central to the 
understanding of social aggregates. In both the group and cognitive realms, 
verbal theories descriptively acknowledge the importance of these phe- 
nomena, but they have proven inadequate to illuminate the dynamics 
through which these qualitative structures come into existence and are 
subsequently modified. Artificial intelligence programing languages, such 
as LISP, provide an excellent symbol system for the theoretical repre- 
sentation of such structures. 
The Third Complexity: Modeling of Response Systems 
A latent variable is a construct that cannot be observed directly, but 
rather must be inferred on the basis of its observable manifestations. 
This is a basic tenet of the multiple indicator approach (Cook & Campbell, 
1984). The third complexity pertains to the manner in which a latent 
variable is related to its observable variables. 
Most theorists in social psychology link the construct to its observables 
by assuming a simple monotonic relation between the two. As aggressive 
tendencies, incentives, or motivations increase (in the form of a latent 
variable), the likelihood of engaging in an aggressive behavior will increase. 
These theories are generally silent on the processes that mediate the 
actual behavioral enactments. Asserting a monotonic relationship may 
describe the form of the function, but does nothing to explain the underlying 
processes. 
This theoretical arena may best be addressed through modeling of 
qualitative structures. For understanding the initiation of deliberate ag- 
gressive acts, for example, it is necessary to know (1) what leads people 
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to generate particular action alternatives and (2) how people select among 
them. These in turn require an understanding of how people sample their 
situated repertoire of actions, how they assess the meaning and implications 
of each alternative, and how they match the features of each alternative 
against their current interaction goals. 
Social psychological theory has also been weak in the area of linguistic 
communication. This is a crucial response system to understand; social 
behavior is dominated by people talking to one another. Yet we know 
very little about how thoughts, feelings, and plans get conveyed to other 
people. A related concern is nonverbal behavior. What leads people to 
smile and scowl, wink and touch, and gaze longingly and embrace? 
Computer simulation provides a symbol system adept at formally rep- 
resenting these kinds of processes. A great deal of work in artificial 
intelligence has already been devoted to understanding natural language 
processing and pragmatics in linguistics. In terms of better understanding 
nonverbal behavior, theorists could benefit from drawing upon current 
work in robotics. This is a field where workers are trying to model the 
relation between motor systems (which in nonverbal behavior would 
include facial expressions, eye contact, and posture) and control systems. 
Many overt displays reflect affective processes. Aggressive action, for 
example, may be produced by feelings of anger or fear. Some workers 
in social psychology appear to think that just because a computer is 
made up of cold steel and plastic, of impersonal chips and wires, that 
computer simulations are unable to model affective and motivational 
processes. But this is completely untrue. Any theory of emotional dynamics 
that can be articulated in a verbal form, can also be expressed through 
the third symbol system. In fact, issues surrounding the simulation of 
motivation and affect have long been addressed by artifical intelligence 
researchers (e.g., Loehlin, 1963; Simon, 1967). 
The Fourth Complexity: Interfacing of Multiple Systems 
As mentioned previously, verbal theories in social psychology focus 
on single dependent variables. Introductory textbooks decompose the 
person into multiple independent compartments, each containing its own 
latent variable. We have, for example, theories of attitude, theories of 
self, theories of altruism, theories of coalition formation, theories of 
attribution, theories of mood, and theories of aggression. Rarely are 
attempts made to examine the interdependencies among two or more of 
the latent variables. 
Nowhere in this picture do we see the whole person. Yet in almost 
any social encounter the person collectively activates many of these 
systems. They are not isolated from one another as the person interacts 
with other people. These latent variables act in unison to characterize 
the whole person. An insult may lead to attitude change, to altruistic or 
388 THOMAS M. OSTROM 
aggressive actions, to inferences and attributions, to a change in mood, 
to a revision of self perception, and to the dissolution of coalitions. 
There is no question that social psychology has advanced understanding 
of social behavior through this strategy of balkanizing the whole person 
and applying theories of the first symbol system to understand each latent 
variable in isolation. But verbal theories have provided very little leverage 
in understanding how each construct interfaces with other latent variables. 
Verbal theories, for example, have been used in research on how 
attitude affects behavior (e.g., Fazio & Zanna, 1981) and how behavior 
(via cognitive dissonance) affects attitudes (e.g., Aronson, 1969). Yet 
little is known about the mutual interdependence between attitudes and 
behavior (or between attitudes and cognitive dissonance). Given that an 
attitude has led to a behavior, under what conditions will that behavior 
alter the initiating attitude? 
The best answer that current theories offer to this kind of question is 
a concatenation of independent processes. That is, one set of principles 
apply going from attitude to behavior and another set apply when going 
from behavior to attitude. Each set of principles is regarded as being 
independent of the other set. 
There indeed may be some pairs of latent variables where simple 
concatenation occurs. But this answer requires that the processes operate 
in sequence rather than in parallel, a requirement that cannot be met for 
all pairs of latent variables studied in social psychology. For example, 
variables like mood and attributional inference appear to coexist as parallel, 
yet interdependent, processes during social encounters. This would seem 
to necessitate the development of nonconcatenated theories of on-line 
interdependence. 
The “concatenation of processes” answer is also inadequate when we 
consider the case of three or more latent variables. If the variables are 
sequentially activated, the order of activation will necessarily be important 
in knowing how each is affected by the preceding ones. The theorist is 
also required to establish priorities as to which contingencies take prec- 
edence when any two or more come into conflict. These types of issues 
are at the heart of understanding the whole person as an integrated 
system. This means that it is necessary to supplement existing theories 
(which deal with how one variable affects a second) with theory regarding 
the determinants of order of activation. 
Computer simulations are well suited for specifying multiple interde- 
pendencies. These if-then contingencies could easily number into the 
hundreds when combining three or more latent variables, a number far 
too great for the theorist to keep track of when asked to generate pre- 
dictions. But with theory-as-program, predictions can be easily and ac- 
curately obtained by running the program on a computer. As example 
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of interfacing systems, the paper by Hastie in this issue of the journal 
offers a model of the interdependence between judgment and recall. 
The Fifth Complexity: Time 
Social behavior is extensive over time. The course of all social interaction 
involves continuous action (at both the psychological and overt levels) 
on the part of all participants. That is, latent variables are continuously 
operating for each person and observable manifestations of one or more 
of these psychological systems are always present. Psychological systems 
cannot be turned off. 
People closely monitor how others react to them. The behavior of the 
other interaction participants offers a guide to how one’s own behavior 
is being interpreted. These feedback cues are also extensive over time 
and can be continuously observed for purposes of adjusting and fine 
tuning our on-line actions. 
Research practices in social psychology lead us to develop theories 
that need only to explain the determinants of one step stimulus-response 
sequences. That is, experiments commonly manipulate an independent 
variable and assess its consequences on a single dependent variable. 
Resulting theories need not have anything to say about the interaction 
history that preceded the manipulation nor anything to say about responses 
subsequent to the dependent variable. 
Ultimately, theory in social psychology will need to deal effectively 
with how people make use of this continuous social feedback in guiding 
their own actions. More formal and elaborated treatment is needed to 
fully understand the kinds of feedback and control processes described, 
for example, by Carver and Scheier (1982). This requires a theory of 
attentional shifts from one part of the stimulus field to another. It requires 
theory of the effects of such feedback on each separate latent variable. 
It requires theory regarding how each of the manifestations of a particular 
variable are affected. And it requires theory of how the principles of 
interfacing between the several systems may be affected by feedback. 
Time is the carrier of the other four complexities. 
As we combine all five complexities, it can be seen that the ultimate 
task of the theorist in social psychology is overwhelming. Verbal theories 
can observe and categorize these complexities, but they are at a loss in 
providing a workable model of how they may operate in detail. Verbal 
theories can (and should) be used to articulate small conceptual modules. 
These modules wilI encompass manageable sets of theoretical propositions 
reflecting one or more of the five complexities. The modules are manageable 
in the sense that the theorist can hold all the variables and relationships 
in mind, and be able to accurately generate predictions. 
Computer simulations come into play when the theorist wants to combine 
these manageable modules into a larger scale model of social behavior. 
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When several modules are combined, and the relations among them are 
conceptually specified, the theorist encounters two serious problems. 
One is to know whether all necessary theoretical decisions have been 
addressed. If some intermodule relationships have been inadvertantly 
omitted, the theorists of the first symbol system may never discover it. 
Second, as more modules are combined into a more comprehensive 
model, the verbal theorist finds it increasingly impossibly to know what 
the theory predicts. 
These problems with verbal theories are solvable by using the third 
symbol system. By stating the modules and their interconnections in the 
form of a program, key theoretical omissions will lead the program to 
crash. The theorist knows then that more conceptual work is needed. 
Once the model is complete, a computer can be used to quickly and 
reliably derive the model’s predictions, regardless of its level of complexity. 
THE FADING SOURCES OF PREJUDICE AGAINST SIMULATION 
For many in social psychology, computer simulations represent an 
alien and perhaps even aberrant approach to theory construction. It is 
an approach that has been avoided, and sometimes even castigated, by 
established theorists in the field. But there are several reasons to believe 
this prejudice is changing. 
Part of the negative feelings derive from the fact that specialized knowl- 
edge is required to implement a simulation. The theorist must be facile 
with computer programming. Since most of the senior people currently 
in the field did not receive training in programming simulations during 
their formal education, they naturally find these skills to be somewhat 
arcane. This should be much less of an impediment for young scholars 
currently entering the field. 
A second source of resistance has been the absence of recognized 
examples of theory advancement through the use of simulation. Even 
though Abelson (1968) reviewed simulations that dealt with several fun- 
damental topics in social psychology, these models were almost completely 
neglected by mainstream theorists. They were seen more as a curiosity 
than as a substantial contribution to understanding. The papers in this 
issue of the journal show that computer simulation is finally coming out 
of the social psychological closet. Scattered papers have also appeared 
in recent years in such key journals as the Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology and Social Cognition. 
A related source of resistance is the lack of role models. Theory is 
done by theorists, and new people entering the field look to the careers 
and intellectual styles of established theorists for guidance. The strongest 
influence of senior scholars is on the graduate students who work with 
them and take courses from them. From the time of Hovland’s and 
Abelson’s papers to the present, there has been less than a handful of 
THIRD SYMBOL SYSTEM 391 
such role models active in the field. That number has more than doubled 
in the last 5 years and should continue to increase rapidly in the future. 
There is a particularly pernicious stereotype among social psychologists 
that is sometimes offered as a justification for rejecting simulations as a 
valid avenue for theory construction. This stereotype is all the more 
deadly because it is often advanced by persons who appear to hold a 
positive attitude toward the use of simulations. These persons correctly 
note that simulations have proven most successful in cognitive psychology, 
and have helped to illuminate our understanding of processes underlying 
such topics as recall, attention, and visual perception. 
The critics conclude from these successes that computer simulation is 
most appropriate for problems of cognitive psychology. They note that 
these successful problem areas all deal with “cold cognition” and that 
most of these simulations attempt to account for findings obtained in 
controlled laboratory tasks. In contrast, the problems of social psychology 
are not so neat. Our theories must ultimately include an understanding 
of affective and motivational processes, and they must deal with the 
complexities inherent in interactions over time between two or more 
persons. The stereotype argues, then, that the problems of social psychology 
are just too complex to yield to antiseptic and sterile simulations. 
This stereotype could not be more wrong. In fact, just the opposite 
is true. Simulations are not needed when theorizing about simple and 
uncomplicated processes. Verbally expressed theories and mathematically 
expressed formulations are fully adequate to this task. In fact, in the 
early stages of developing a theoretical module, verbal theories may 
prove superior to simulations. The inherent ambiguity of natural language 
provides a richness and flexibility that allows the theorist to mentally 
explore a vast array of possibilities. For example, premature simulation 
of dissonance theory could well have interferred with discovering the 
“nonobvious” implications of the model. 
Simulations should only be undertaken when the complexity of the 
theoretical processes exceed the ability of the theorist to hold all relevent 
postulates in mind and to accurately generate predictions. The computer 
program becomes the mode through which the theoretical ideas are ex- 
pressed and the computer is the device that enables the theorist to 
generate the model’s predictions. As this view of computer simulation 
becomes more widely accepted, its use in theory construction should 
increase and the field’s ability to address truly complex phenomena will 
advance dramatically. 
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